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Pre-globalization tax systems were devised in an environment where international trade 
was restricted by tariffs and transportation costs, and capital nlovements were nearly non-
existent. Now that these restrictions are reduced, taxation can have spillover effects that 
cross national borders. This has increased the power that tax rates have over the conduct 
of international economic activity, which could cause some potential problems such as 
the loss of government tax revenue and the distortion of investment location decisions. 
The goal of this study is to provide an introduction to this new issue in international 
public finance and a summary of the debate surrounding it. This study outlines evidence 
that shows that multinational firms routinely use tax avoidance to reduce their global tax 
burdens. The study then provides an introduction to the debate on whether or not tax 
competition is good or bad. In conclusion the study provides an econometric analysis of 
the relationship between tax rates and international flows of U.S. investment, and finds 
that tax rates have no statistically significant impact on the location of U.S. PPE 







- TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. An Introduction To Globalization And International Capital Taxation. p.l - II. The Problem Of Revenue Loss. p.7 
- III. The Arguments For And Against Tax Competition. p.ll 
IV. An Empirical Study On The Effects Of Tax Rates On Investment Location - Decisions. p. 30 




























I: AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
CAPITAL TAXATION 
The past few decades have seen rapid technological advancements in areas 
such as computers, communication, and transportation. These advancements have 
allowed an unprecedented level of high-speed global communication and transportation 
that have transformed the global economy. This is a transformation from a global 
economy divided by national borders to a new global economy, which increasingly 
behaves as a single world market. In this transformation national borders are slowly 
losing their relevance, and nations are becoming increasingly interdependent. Now 
government policies, which once had no effect on the global economy, can have a global 
impact. One such policy area is the taxation of capital income. Tax systems were 
previously devised in an environment where international trade was restricted by tariffs 
and transportation costs, and capital movements were nearly non-existent. Now that 
these restrictions are reduced, taxation can have spillover effects that cross national 
borders. This has increased the power that tax rates have over the conduct of 
international economic activity, which could cause some potential problems such as the 
loss of government tax revenue and the distortion of investment location decisions. The 
goal of this study is to provide an introduction to this new issue in international public 
finance and a summary of the debate surrounding it. 
1. THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION 
Globalization itself is not so much an inevitable economic force as it is a 
combination of changes in government policy and new technologies made available since 





















of political institutions was created that contributed to globalization by creating greater 
political and economic stability. The United Nations and regional organizations like the 
European Union, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African 
Unity all helped to create greater political stability. Greater financial stability was 
brought to the world through the creation of the International Monetary Fund. The task 
of managing global economic development was given to the World Bank, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was created to reduce barriers to global trade. 
Also exchange rate regimes were liberalized by most governments, thus opening the way 
for a global capital market. The results of these government policies are that the average 
tariff rate has dropped from 40 percent in 1950 to 5 percent in 1980 (Tanzi, 1995), that 
gross volume of turnover in foreign exchange markets averages $1.5 trillion per day 
(Frankel, 2000), and trade volume has grown at an average annual rate of 5.1 percent 
while world output has only grown at an average annual rate of 2.1 percent (Tanzi, 1995). 
Thus in many ways globalization was and is dependent on certain political policies. 
Globalization was not only the product of government policies; it was also created 
by technological advancements in transportation, computers, and communication. 
Thanks to new developments like supertankers, rol1-on-roll-off cargo ships, and 
containerized cargo, the average ocean freight and port charges per short ton of U.S. 
imports and exports fell from $95 in 1930 to $29 in 1990 (in 1990 U.S. dollars). Air 
transportation has also become cheaper, with revenue per passenger mile falling from 
$0.68 in 1930 to $0.11 in 1990 (in 1990 U.S. dollars) (Frankel, 2000). Advances in 
communications have also had a powerful effect on the global economy by reducing the 





















1930 and 1990 the cost of a three minute phone call between New York and London fell 
from $244.65 to $3.32 (in 1990 U.S. dollars) (Frankel, 2000). The computerization of 
production is also a driving force behind globalization, since it has allowed the 
international production processes used by multinational corporations to become more 
efficient by integrating them through global computer networks. All of these political and 
technological forces have had many positive effects on everyone's daily lives. The 
world's resources are better allocated, thus increasing living standards. Also, people may 
choose from a greater variety of goods and services, and they may travel in ways that 
were once prohibitively expensive. Yet, not only has trade become internationalized, so 
have economic distortions like those caused by taxation. Thus governments must now 
consider the international impact of their tax systems. 
2. THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION 
The primary problem with the world's tax system in this climate of globalization 
is that both source-based and residence-based taxes are being used simultaneously. The 
source and residence principles are the two methods of capital income taxation. 
According to the source principle, income should be taxed by the nation in which the 
income was generated, while the residence principle holds that income should be taxed 
by the nation in which the income's recipient lives. If source-based taxes are used to the 
exclusion of residence-based taxes then capital import neutrality is achieved. Capital 
import neutrality means that both the foreign and domestic owned firms within a country 
face the same tax rates because they both pay taxes only to the country in which they are 
located, and thus neither group of firms can have a tax advantage against the other. 





















capital export neutrality is achieved. Capital export neutrality means that investment 
location will not be influenced by tax rates because investors will only pay taxes to their 
country of residence not to the country in which they invest. Therefore tax rate 
differences will not influence investment because regardless of where the investment is 
located the resulting income will be taxed at the same rate (Ondrich and Wasylenko, 
1993). Due to the fact that both principles are currently used by the nations of the world, 
taxes have the capacity to distort global economic behavior! . 
If the nations of the world were to decide to use only one of these tax principles, 
the world's tax system would have less distortionary effects on the world economy 
(Tanzi, 1995). Yet, it is unlikely that either form of taxation will be eliminated. One 
reason for this is simply that nations have more revenue options if they use both 
principles of taxation. The Residence principle allows nations to tax the income that their 
residents have earned in other counties, while the source principle allows governments to 
export a portion of their tax burdens to other nations by taxing the income of foreigners. 
The rational for taxing the income that a nation's residents have earned in other countries 
is that a nation's citizens have a duty to support the expenses of their government, thus 
even the income that they earn in other countries should be taxed. The rational for taxing 
the income of foreigners is that all income generated within a nation benefits from the 
services provided by that nation's government, such as spending on infrastructure, 
education, security, and research and development. Thus nations have the right to tax 
income, even if it is going to foreign recipients, since this income benefited from 
1 Examples of these distortions include influence over the location of international investment, the 
financing of multinational affiliates, the determination of transfer prices used in intra-firm trade, and the 





















government services. Therefore in today's world we have both forms of taxation, and we 
will continue to have both forms of taxation. 
3. POTENTIAL CONCERNS 
There are two main concerns arising from the world's use of both principles of 
taxation. The first of these is that differences between tax regimes will lead to a loss of 
tax revenue. Multinational corporations do not have to relocate production facilities to 
take advantage of lower taxes in another country. Instead they can use various 
accounting methods to shift profits from affiliates in high tax nations to affiliates in low 
tax nations. These methods involve using debt, instead of equity, to finance affiliates in 
high tax countries, the manipulation of trade between related affiliates in order to reduce 
the reported profits of affiliates in high tax countries while increasing the reported profits 
of affiliates in low tax countries, and conducting research and development in countries 
with high royalty withholding taxes so that these taxes do not have to be paid. All of 
these methods can be used to minimize a multinational corporation's global tax burden, 
thus posing a threat to many governments' financial stability. 
The second concern is that the vast differences that exist between the world's tax 
regimes will distort real economic behavior. There is the fear that such differences could 
effect how much is invested and where that investment will be located. For the sake of 
efficiency, investment should be located where it can receive the highest possible returns. 
Thus investment should flow to firms able to produce at the minimum cost and to the 
locations where this production can be conducted at the minimum cost. However, once 
source-based taxes enter the analysis, firms focus on maximizing post-tax returns. This 





















lower taxes. For example, a firm could choose to produce in a low tax country with high 
production costs because the lower tax payment offsets the higher production costs. 
Although the firm is maximizing its post-tax returns and the country is benefiting from 
the investment, economic resources are being wasted on every unit of production as a 
direct result of the tax differences. There is one caveat to this concern, which is that 
nations have many non-tax characteristics that may be more important than tax 
considerations, such as available resources, infrastructure, the education of the workforce, 
and the accessibility of relevant markets (Bond, 2000). 
4. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY 
Thus the fact that the tax regimes of the world use both source and residence 
based tax systems in today's environment of globalization could cause revenue loss and 
economic distortions on a global scale. The next two sections of this paper will take an 
in-depth look at the problem of revenue loss and the debate that has arisen concerning 
what should be done about this loss. Section II will study various methods of tax 
avoidance commonly used by multinational firms, and it will cite empirical evidence, 
which shows that such behavior is common. If the rise of globalization and the structure 
of the world's tax system gi ve multinational firms some freedom of choice about how 
much tax they must legally pay, would not such competition be good in that it motivates 
governments to provide quality services at lower costs? Section III of this paper will be a 
discussion of the current debate surrounding the answer to this question. As in all 
political debates the answers depend more on personal political philosophy than on any 
tangible truth, and thus this is a debate that will always exist. Section IV will look at the 





















effect that tax rates have on investment location decisions. The results of this analysis 
contrast similar previous work by implying that taxes do not have a high level of 
influence on investment location decisions. Thus the world's tax system may not distort 
real economic activity as badly as some have feared. 
II: THE PROBLEM OF REVENUE LOSS 
Recent empirical findings suggest that taxes do have a powerful distortionary 
impact on business activities carried out by multinational firms, such as how they finance 
their affiliates, conduct intra-firm trade, and conduct research and development. These 
activities are attempts at tax avoidance, and they lead to a loss of tax revenue on a global 
scale. 
Multinational enterprises are a product of globalization, and they are powerful 
members of the global market place. These firms consist of subsidiaries spread across 
the globe that divide between them the various phases of the parent company's 
production process. Each subsidiary has a specialized purpose, and they are each placed 
in nations that have the geographic, economic, and government environments best suited 
for the objectives of the subsidiary's specialty. Due to the global nature of multinational 
firms, they are not rigidly constrained by national borders or the legal environments 
within those borders. If a multinational firm has an affiliate in a high tax nation, the firm 
can use various methods to shift the affiliate's profits to low tax environments, thus 
minimizing the multinational's global tax burden. Thus multinational firms go through a 
great deal of effort to rearrange their financial structures around various tax systems. 
This is an example of the distorting influence tax systems can have on international 




















The financing of foreign affiliates provides a simple method to help in 
multinational firms' attempts to minimize tax obligations. If a parent company finances 
investment in its foreign affiliates through the use of equity, then its foreign profits are 
taxed in the affiliate's host country, and no tax is owed in the parent company's country 
until the profits are repatriated. If the parent company finances its investment with debt, 
then the affiliate pays interest which can be deducted from its taxes and the parent 
company receives income from the interest. Therefore multinationals tend to finance 
investment in a foreign affiliate with equity when the affiliate is located in a low tax 
environment, and with debt when the affiliate is located in a high tax environment (Hines, 
1999). The empirical studies in this area are consistent with these tax incentives. Hines 
and Hubbard (1990) found that affiliates that were financed with loans from the parent 
corporation face a higher average tax rate than affiliates that were financed with equity. 
Also, Grubert (1998) found that high corporate tax rates in a nation where an affiliate is 
located are correlated with higher interest payments and lower dividend payments to the 
parent corporation. 
Transactions between affiliates of multinationals compose a major share of all 
international trade. In fact, one third of today's international trade in manufactures 
occurs within firms (Tanzi, 1996). This is due to the growing influence of multinationals 
in the global economy and the fact that multinationals tend to be vertically integrated 
with numerous affiliates producing raw, intermediate, and final goods. For example, raw 
materials might be acquired by affiliate A in country B. Then they are shipped to affiliate 
C in country D to refine the raw materials into component parts, and finally these parts 





















components are transferred from one affiliate to another, a transaction involving a 
transfer price is required by international law . Transfer prices are the prices that are 
charged among related companies for goods or services. The international rules 
governing these transfer prices require that they be based on what the good or service 
would be worth on the world market (Bond 2000). Yet many of the components that are 
transferred have no markets from which a market price can be determined. For example, 
the production of a modem aircraft may require millions of parts, many of which are 
produced specifically for that model of aircraft and are not sold in any market (Tanzi, 
1996). Therefore governments cannot determine if most transfer prices are accurate. 
This leaves multinationals with a great deal of freedom in how they set their transfer 
prices and allows such price determination to become a method of tax avoidance. For 
example, multinationals typically reduce the prices charged by affiliates in high tax 
countries for components provided to affiliates in lower tax countries. This allows the 
multinational to reduce its global tax burden by shifting profits from high tax countries to 
low tax countries (Hines, 1999). 
Two studies that provide evidence of tax-motivated transfer pricing are Grubert 
and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994). Grubert and Mutti (1991) study the effect 
of tax rates on the profit/sales ratios of U.S. controlled affiliates in 29 countries. Their 
study implies that an affiliate in, "a country with a 40% tax rate will report profits of 
5.6% of sales, compared to 12.6% in a country with a 20% tax rate." (Grubert and Mutti, 
1991, pp. 287-288). Hines and Rice (1994) include 59 countries in their study and 
conclude that tax rates do have a significant influence on reported profitability. In fact 





















profits by 20 percent. .. " (Hines and Rice, 1994, p.168). The fact that these studies find a 
negative correlation between tax rates and before-tax reported profits, suggests that tax 
avoidance is a common occurrence. 
Finally, the location of research and development is also influenced by tax rates. 
Evidence of this is provided in a study by James Hines, which finds that affiliates are 
indeed more research and development intensive if they are located in nations with high 
royalty withholding taxes (Hines, 1999). International differences in royalty withholding 
taxes influence R&D decisions because such withholding taxes increase the cost of 
importing technology, and in many cases importing technology and domestic R&D are 
substitutes. Therefore firms in countries with relatively high royalty withholding taxes 
will tend to spend more on R&D so that they can import less technology. 
The extent to which methods of tax avoidance are used can be seen in the large 
amounts of business activity that occur in tax havens. James Hines conducted a study 
that identified forty-one countries as the world's tax havens. These nations account for 
1.2 percent of world population and 3 percent of world GDP . Yet these havens also 
account for 25 percent or $359 billion of the $1.35 trillion in global corporate activity 
conducted by U.S. multinational enterprises, 26 percent of U.S. corporate assets, 21.4 
percent of U.S. corporate equity, and 30.6 percent of U.S. corporate profits. However 
these tax havens only account for 4.3 percent of U.S. corporate employment and 4.2 
percent of U.S. corporate plant, property, and equipment (Hines, 1994). Such 
disproportionately large holdings of U.S. assets and profits by tax havens shows that U.S. 





















multinationals shift profits to such a large degree, then most other multinationals must 
shift profits to the same degree in order to remain competitive. 
Thus we have seen that taxes do distort economic behavior such as the financing 
of foreign affiliates, the conduct of intra-firm trade, and the location of research and 
development. Not only are these distortions anticipated by economic theory, but also 
they have been measured through a number of empirical studies. All of this evidence 
suggests that tax avoidance is a common occurrence in today's global economy. This is a 
cause for concern among many national governments, especially ones that provide large 
levels of government services, which fear a significant loss of revenue from such tax 
avoidance behavior. However, for those who believe that governments are inherently 
inefficient, the freedoms offered by tax avoidance are seen as a positive development, 
since the reSUlting tax competition will encourage governments to be more efficient. 
Thus a debate has arisen over the issue of whether or not the effects of tax competition 
should be reduced. 
III: THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST TAX COMPETITION 
The forms and levels of taxation that a nation uses have always been dependent 
on the desired level of government spending and the redistributive aims of the country, 
and have always been shaped at the sub-national level by tax competition between local 
governments. However the reduction of trade barriers, such as tariffs and capital 
controls, and the resulting rapid globalization of trade and investment have dramatically 
increased the amount of influence that tax systems have on the international economy. 
Thus the high mobility of capital and the rising international influence of tax systems 





















order to make their jurisdictions more attractive for capital investment. Some fear that 
such reviews only result in lower tax rates on capital income and that such tax 
competition could lead to a prisoner's dilemma scenario in which national governments 
race to the bottom and all become worse off. There are two opinions on what the effects 
of this international competition will be. Some believe that such tax competition will 
force governments to be more efficient, while others believe that such competition could 
destabilize the progressi ve tax systems upon which the modem welfare state depends. 
1. ARGUMENTS FOR TAX COMPETITION 
The proponents of international tax competition tend to have the view that 
governments are inefficient leviathans, in which elected officials and government 
employees are just as focused, if not more so, on maximizing their own welfare as they 
are on maximizing the welfare of their constituents. In such a government environment, 
constraints are required to limit this natural tendency to be wasteful. Thus proponents of 
the leviathan view of government tend to see the rise in international tax competition as 
an emerging potential cure for government waste. It is their hope that tax competition 
will bring to bear on national governments the same market forces that cause efficiency 
among private firms. The proponents of this view look to an article written by Charles 
Tiebout in 1956 titled "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures" as the most elegant 
description of how competition between governments can bring about efficient levels of 
government spending. They apply Tiebout's theory to the case of international tax 
competition in order to show that international tax competition will actually increase 





















economic efficiency and living standards, increasing government efficiency, and forcing 
taxes to be more equitable by making them commensurate with benefits. 
1.1 THE LEVIATHAN VIEW OF GOVERNMENT 
The traditional view of government spending is that governments are constrained 
by the citizens' preferences for public spending as expressed through the political 
process. It is believed that, when all the members of the political process act to defend 
their own interests, the government's policies will reflect the will of the people. This 
principle of self-interest is the common foundation of both democratic politics as well as 
capitalism. However, what is not as commonly commented on is that it is not only the 
voter who acts in his or her own self interest, but also those who hold positions in 
government. This group is composed of both politicians, who are somewhat constrained 
by elections and the desire to stay in office, and bureaucrats, who are under no such 
democratic constraints. While it may be in the voter's self interest for high quality 
government services to be provided at the lowest possible rate of taxation, it is in the 
government official's self interest to have enough surplus revenue to keep government 
free of the rigors of cost minimizing efficiency (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977). Due to 
this divergence in the self-interest of constituents and government officials, a new 
constraint on government spending is needed. This new constraint must not be a new 
political institution, since that would only repeat the same divergence. Thus proponents 





















1.2 TIEBOUT'S THEORY 
Tiebout's model of government competition envisions a market for public goods 
composed of two types of agents: 1) voter-consumers, who each have a unique set of 
preferences for government service-taxation packages and are willing to move to 
whichever government jurisdiction best satisfies these preferences, and 2) governments, 
which exist in large numbers and each have unique packages of services and taxes. The 
major assumptions in this model are that voter-consumers are fully mobile, have full 
knowledge of the differences that exist between government service-tax packages, and 
that governments only impose benefit taxes. In this market for public services, voter-
consumers communicate their preferences for government services and taxation not 
through participation in a political system, but by moving from one jurisdiction to 
another. Thus the model sees the normal political process of voting in elections as being 
unresponsive in matters of public spending, and thus the only option left to the voter-
consumer is to move to whatever jurisdiction best satisfies its preferences. This model 
works well for supporters of the leviathan view of government since they see government 
spending as being more under the control of politicians and bureaucrats than under the 
control of the constituency. Once voter-consumers have located in the jurisdictions that 
best meet their preferences for public goods and taxes, the government is little more than 
a broker for public services. Since the preferences of the governments and their voter-
consumer residents perfectly match up, the government demand for services accurately 
depicts the public's demand for public services. If a voter-consumer learns that a 
government jurisdiction is offering the same services at the same quality as those offered 





















move to that jurisdiction. In order to keep their residents, each government must 
constantly strive to increase the quality of the government services provided while also 
working to produce those services at a lower average cost so that taxes can be lowered. 
Thus an efficient market for public goods is created (Tiebout, 1956). 
1.3 APPLYING TIEBOUT'S THEORY TO THE GLOBAL TAX SYSTEM 
For proponents of the leviathan view of government, this would be the ideal 
environment for the governments of the world to operate in. However this environment 
can only exist if tax competition is allowed to exist, mobility is free of costs, and taxes 
are made to function as benefit taxes whenever possible. One of the greatest concerns of 
those who oppose tax competition is that it could make funding the social programs of 
the welfare state more difficult. However, the supporters of tax competition believe that 
tax rates should reflect the benefits derived from those taxes. Thus welfare states should 
not tax mobile international capital and multinational enterprises too heavily in order to 
fund social programs because international capital and multinationals derive few benefits 
from such programs. For example, international capital and multinational corporations 
derive benefits from government spending in national defense, crime reduction, 
education, and research, but they do not derive much benefit from government spending 
on subsidies for the poor, aid for the disabled, environmental protection, and so on. Thus 
tax competition proponents argue that welfare states are having financial problems in 
today's highly globalized economy not because of tax competition, but because of 
improperly structured tax systems that force mobile corporations and international capital 
to pay for government programs that they do not need (McLure, 1986). Supporters of tax 





















imposed on an individual or corporation reflect the benefits derived from such taxation, 
tax competition would not be much of a problem. 
The opponents of tax competition might argue that the programs of the welfare 
state could not survive in such a Tieboutian system of benefit taxation, but this might not 
necessarily be the case. The poor are not the only ones who benefit from social 
programs; even the wealthy derive some benefits from them. For example, the social 
programs of the welfare state provide the wealthy with a type of insurance that the private 
market cannot provide. This would be insurance against exploitation by a poverty 
stricken majority and against an increasing crime rate. There is even evidence of a 
welfare state that has survived in a Tieboutian system of taxation thanks to a recent 
empirical study. This welfare state is Switzerland and its canton system of government. 
In Switzerland each canton has the freedom to design its own tax system, and the people 
have total freedom to live in any canton they want. In such a small country one would 
think that the wealthy would move to the cantons with the lowest transfer payments while 
the poor would move to the cantons with the highest transfer payments, thus causing the 
collapse of the welfare state in Switzerland. On the contrary, the welfare state in 
Switzerland has survived even though it is conducted at the canton level with little 
assistance from the federal government (Feld, 2000). Although the assumptions of the 
Tiebout model can never be fully realized at the international level, proponents look to 
this study as evidence that the Tiebout model can work. 
1.4 REFORMS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPETITION 
The kinds of reforms that supporters of tax competition would implement would 





















Thus one of the reforms that proponents of tax competition would support is the 
simplification of tax codes so that taxpayers find them easier to understand. Making 
reporting requirements less complex could do this, and it would also lower the costs of 
compliance. Simplifying the tax system could also include eliminating exemptions, 
which would eliminate more complex tax regulations and increase efficiency by 
broadening the tax base. 
Increasing the global use of benefit taxes would be another reform that proponents 
of tax competition would like to see carried out. Such benefit taxes would work by 
earmarking the revenues of certain taxes so that they would be used to fund certain 
government programs. Thus all taxes would be proportional to the benefits that they 
helped to fund. For example, taxes on gasoline and vehicles would go to support 
highway funding, since those who buy gasoline and vehicles are the ones who most 
directly benefit from highway spending. Another example would be that taxes on the 
incomes of individuals could help support their nation's programs for the poor, since 
these people have to live with the social consequences of poverty. According to 
proponents of the Leviathan view, not only does this make taxation more fair by making 
people pay only for the government services that they gain utility from, but it also makes 
the size of the government's spending for a certain program rise and fall according to the 
demand for that program's services. For example, the less people spend on gasoline and 
vehicles the less there is for the government to spend on highways, but the lower demand 
for gasoline and vehicles implies a lower demand for highways so less money will be 
needed for their maintenance (Brennan and Buchanan, 1978). The way this tax structure 





















viewpoint of those who support tax competition since they tend to support the leviathan 
view of government. 
Another reform that supporters of tax competition would support would be efforts 
to increase the international mobility of labor, since a mobile labor force is one of the 
assumptions of the Tiebout model. The forces of globalization would increase the 
mobility of the world's labor force if it were not for a few government barriers that have 
basically trapped these people within their nation's borders. In fact before the Great 
Depression there was far more labor mobility than there is today even though 
transportation is now much cheaper. The problem is that the backlash against 
globalization that occurred during the great depression forced governments to enact a 
number of immigration restrictions that still exist today. Thus today there are limits to 
the number of immigrants that anyone nation will accept in a single year, and even those 
who are accepted face challenging obstacles. Also, individuals are required to have a 
visa before they are allowed to even visit a foreign land, and in order to work there they 
must acquire hard to get work permits. Even the accreditation of diplomas and degrees is 
a barrier to labor mobility, since these obstacles make it harder for one's skills to be 
recognized by foreign employers or educational institutions (Tanzi, 1995). It should be 
noted that there will always be barriers to labor mobility such as linguistic and cultural 
barriers, but if these government barriers could be eased than labor would have greater 
mobility. This would increase the allocation of the world's labor supply, give individuals 
some of the freedoms of choice which exist in the Tiebout model, and it would offer 






















Thus proponents of tax competition and the leviathan view of government believe 
that governments are inherently wasteful, and that tax competition could create an 
efficient market for public goods by forcing governments to be more efficient. As 
mentioned above, there is evidence that such a market for public services could be 
created through the use of a tax system like that outlined in the Tiebout model and used 
in the Swiss cantons. All that would be necessary to make the world's tax system more 
like that of the Tiebout model would be to decrease the costs of compliance, increase the 
use of benefit taxes, and increase the mobility of the world's labor force. These reforms 
would allow both increased economic efficiency and increased government efficiency, 
while at the same time allowing tax competition to continue with few negative effects. 
2. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST TAX COMPETITION 
Those who oppose tax competition share a belief that income from capital will 
increasingly face a lighter tax burden due to the downward pressure that tax competition 
exerts on tax rates. It is believed that such large differentials between tax rates and such 
large reductions in the tax burden faced by capital income will result in negative equity 
consequences on a global scale. The equity consequences are that the ever dwindling tax 
revenues acquired through the taxation of capital income will force governments to make 
up for the revenue loss by increasing the rates of more regressive taxes such as 
consumption taxes and payroll taxes. The increasing reliance on such regressive taxes 
will reduce the redistributive, and revenue-earning capacity of tax systems in developed 
welfare states. A prospect that is increasingly disturbing when one looks at current 
demographic trends. In the not too distant future welfare states will have to care for 





















who are of working age. If welfare states do not have the revenues necessary to fund 
such massive social spending programs, the only recourse will be for such social benefits 
to be reduced. Unfortunately they would be reduced at a time when they are most needed 
due to the destabilizing effects of globalization. The greatest fear of opponents of tax 
competition is that such reductions in social spending could cause a backlash against 
globalization, which overall is having a positive effect on the world economy. Therefore, 
the arguments of those in opposition to tax competition consist of a series of predictions 
that start with decreased capital income taxation and end with the possible break down of 
the welfare state and globalization, and thus they see the end of such harmful tax 
competition as being centrally important if the benefits of globalization are to be realized. 
This discussion of the arguments against tax competition will consist of summaries of the 
three main arguments used by opponents of tax competition. These arguments are that 
tax competition leads to the under taxation of capital income, a loss of equity in the 
global tax system, and the undermining of funding for the social programs of the welfare 
state. 
2.1 THE CAUSES OF UNDER-TAXATION IN TAX JURISDICTIONS 
There are three jurisdictions that have the right to tax income made from 
international commerce, and opponents of tax competition believe that these jurisdictions 
will place an increasingly lighter tax burden on such income. These jurisdictions are the 
demand jurisdiction, in which a firm sells its products, the supply jurisdiction, in which a 
firm produces its products, and the residence jurisdiction, in which a firm is incorporated 
or administered. According to the opponents of tax competition, the incentives and tax 





















needed taxation of international corporate income. Currently the residence and supply 
jurisdictions have the greatest ability to collect taxes on international earnings, since 
firms must have a physical presence in these jurisdictions. However they lack the 
incentive to aggressively tax such inconle due to the highly competitive nature of such 
taxation. Taxation among supply and residence jurisdictions is competitive due to the 
emergence of "production and administration tax havens". These are countries with 
preferential tax regimes that provide foreign firms with reduced tax rates to the point that 
these firms are receiving government services at the expense of domestic firms and 
individuals. Opponents of tax competition believe that the emergence of this new kind of 
tax haven, all nations have had to reduce their tax rates out of fear that international firms 
will locate elsewhere. Such preferential regimes have spread to the point that there are 
now 103 countries offering special tax concessions to foreign firms that agree to set up 
production or administration facilities in their country (Avi-Yonah, 2000). It is expected 
by opponents of tax competition that such tax havens will become increasingly attractive 
to international firms due to the rise of electronic commerce, which will make it easier for 
firms to locate operations in these tax havens. This will be especially true of firms that 
are involved with the growing trade in digitizable goods and services. Of these two 
jurisdictions, the residence jurisdictions will have the hardest time collecting revenues 
since they already offer their multinational firms exemptions from the taxation of foreign 
source income or deferral of such taxation until the profits are repatriated. This allows 
multinational firms to avoid paying taxes on foreign source income indefinitely. 
Demand jurisdictions have the greatest desire to tax such income since the income 





















increasingly difficult to find firms with a permanent establishment or nexus in its 
jurisdiction. The reason for this is that tariffs are continually decreasing. Tariffs once 
forced foreign firms that wanted a large market share in a demand jurisdiction to set up a 
permanent establishment in order to avoid paying tariffs. Now that tariffs are decreasing, 
the need to set up such permanent establishments is also decreasing. Also the emergence 
of electronic commerce will make it easier for firms to sell their products without a 
physical presence in the demand jurisdiction. Thus all three tax jurisdictions will find it 
increasingly more difficult to tax international commerce due to the emergence of 
production and administration tax havens, electronic comnlerce, and greater investment 
mobility. In a global tax system like this, in which every tax jurisdiction will have 
difficulty taxing capital income, there is bound to be revenue loss. Opponents of tax 
competition believe that this revenue loss will have negative global consequences on the 
equity of taxation. 
2.2 EFFECTS OF TAX COMPETITION ON EQUITY 
For opponents of tax competition, the most disturbing consequence of tax 
competition is that income derived from capital is being taxed at ever decreasing 
effective rates. Since the wealthier segments of society save a larger proportion of their 
wealth and derive a larger proportion of their income from non-wage sources than do 
those in the lower economic segments of society, these lower effective tax rates on 
capital have serious implications for the equity of the global tax system. In order for a 
tax system to be considered equitable, individuals in the wealthier segments of society 
should face an average tax rate that is at least equal to that faced by individuals in lower 





















competition has caused tax rates on capital income to reach effective rates that are 
extremely low or nearly zero. Therefore it is possible for the wealthy to face lower 
average tax rates than those faced by less wealthy individuals. The reason for this is that 
if less wealthy individuals receive most of their income from eanled income while 
wealthy individuals receive most of their income from capital investments that are taxed 
at a near zero effective rate, then it is possible for the average rate of taxation faced by 
the wealthy to be less than that faced by less wealthy individuals. A situation like this is 
a serious threat to the progressive tax rates and redistributive goals of national 
governments. 
These low effective rates of taxation on capital also threaten to make national tax 
systems more regressive due to the revenue loss that it forces governments to experience. 
This is due to the fact that governments must raise revenue, and if international capital 
cannot be taxed as heavily as it once was then the loss must be recovered by raising other 
tax rates. Unfortunately the taxes that are left to governments to increase for added 
revenue tend to be regressive. For example, between 1965 and 1995 government 
revenues as a percentage of GDP among OECD countries saw a significant increase. 
However during this same period among OECD countries, income taxes as a percentage 
of government revenues have remained relatively unchanged while payroll taxes as a 
percentage of government revenues have increased on average from 18 percent to 25 
percent and consumption taxes have increased from 12 percent to 18 percent (Avi-Yonah, 
2000). Trends like these suggest that national governments have compensated for tax 
competition related revenue losses by increasing the tax burden imposed on less wealthy 





















competition believe that tax competition will possibly result in a regressive world tax 
system. 
2.3 TAX COMPETITION AND THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE 
Progressive taxation is one of the principles upon which the welfare state was 
founded. The benefits of the welfare state tend to go to members of the lower and middle 
classes, and are theoretic all y paid for by imposing on the upper classes a higher average 
tax rate. Thus the tax systems and social benefits of the welfare state act as a 
redistribution of wealth from the upper classes to the middle and lower classes. However 
it is the argument of tax competition opponents that tax competition will allow capital 
income to be taxed at ever-lower effective rates thus making the tax systems that support 
the welfare state regressive in nature. This has the effect of putting the burden of paying 
for the social benefits that go to the lower and middle classes on the lower and middle 
classes themselves. When this occurs the redistributive goals of the welfare state 
collapse. Under normal conditions this in and of itself would be a great threat to the 
welfare state, but current demographic trends in the number of future retired persons will 
put even greater stress on the welfare state. 
The fact that in the future retired persons will out number working age people is a 
great danger to the future stability of the welfare state. In 1990 18 percent of the DEeD 
countries' population was over the age of sixty. By 2030 the World Bank expects this 
number to rise to an average of 30 percent. Percentages like these will be true for most 
countries, but other countries like Japan will have a far more difficult time. In 2040, 
Japan is expected to have a population in which 52 percent are over the age of 65 while 





















rates have dropped because parents have decided that having large families is too 
expensive. At the same time the quality of health care has greatly improved, thus 
allowing people to live longer lives (Beck, 1995). The problem with these trends is that 
the baby boom generation is li ving longer, but failed to produce birth rates high enough 
to easily fund their government pensions. In times like these welfare states will need 
every penny they can find. Thus in this kind of environment the revenue losses created 
by tax competition become all the more grave. 
Some may ask if the welfare state is simply no longer economically useful, but 
opponents of tax competition answer that globalization and its resulting economic flux 
requires a social safety net. The more open a country is to international trade, the more 
economic risk it places on its citizens. It is the opinion of opponents of tax competition 
that the government has a responsibility to reduce the risk that globalization places on its 
citizens. This risk is reduced by the social safety net, especially unemployment and 
worker retraining benefits. Such benefits not only prevent the population from becoming 
desperately frustrated with international economic forces out of their control, but it also 
allows a nation's work force to adapt to the demands of the global market more quickly 
by retraining them for new roles. Without the welfare state, nations would be sluggish in 
their response to global economic change, thus causing painful consequences for ordinary 
citizens displaced by the forces of globalization. If significant segments of society came 
to have an overly negative view of globalization, then globalization itself could end along 
with its positive side effects. It should be noted that globalization is not some 
unstoppable economic force; instead it relies on political support. Globalization is the 





















These are all political policies that could be reversed if citizens without a proper social 
safety net allowed their fears to get the best of them. This is exactly what happened at 
the beginning of the Great Depression, when the incredible forces of globalization 
present throughout the nineteenth century were brought to a halt in 1914 due to political 
barriers like isolationism, increased tariffs, and immigration restrictions (Frankel, 2000). 
If such a backlash against globalization were to occur, all of the many benefits of 
globalization would be eliminated. 
2.4 REFORMS TO REDUCE TAX COMPETITION 
With all of these negative consequences of tax competition, the opponents of tax 
competition believe it is vital that reforms of the global tax system are made that reduce 
this competition. Since some variation in tax rates is inevitable, the opponents of tax 
competition do not believe that nations should have equal tax rates. Instead they call for 
the elimination of harmful tax competition and the creation of a tax floor that would set a 
global minimum for the world's tax rates. Two international organizations that are 
committed to the reduction of harmful tax competition are the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the European Union. However, before discussing 
their reform initiatives it will be useful to explore how they define harmful tax 
competition. 
A report, commissioned in 1998 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, addresses this issue and outlines various criteria that can be used to 
identify tax systems that are behaving in a harmfully competitive manner. The criteria 
listed in the OECD report are in agreement with similar criteria listed in European Union 





















safely be considered an internationally recognized standard for determining if a tax 
regime is harmfully competitive. The first characteristic of a competitive tax regime is 
that there is a low or zero effective tax rate on the relevant income. This simply means 
that the tax rate is unusually low when compared to similar taxes imposed by other 
countries. The second characteristic is that the regime is "ring fenced", which means that 
the low tax rates offered to foreign companies by the nation's tax system are not offered 
to companies which are owned domestically. This is an attempt by the taxing nation to 
protect its own revenue base from the unusually low tax rates that it is offering to foreign 
companies. The third characteristic of a competitive tax regime is that there exists a lack 
of transparency in the administration of the regime. This usually implies that the tax rates 
offered by a regime to foreign companies are the product of secret negotiations, thus 
making it harder for the foreign company's home country to take defensive measures. 
The last key characteristic is that there is a lack of effective exchange of information 
between the nation in question and other governments. The use of such secrecy by a tax 
regime usually implies that the country is helping foreign companies to hide information 
regarding revenue and profits from the companies' honle countries (DECD, 1998). Any 
national tax system that has a combination of two or more of these characteristics fits the 
generally recognized international definition of a harmfully competitive tax system. 
A report released by the DECD in April of 1998, titled "Harmful Tax 
Competition, An Emerging Global Issue", outlines a number of reforms that will be 
needed if harmful tax competition is to be reduced. The reforms fall into three 
categories: 1) domestic legislation, 2) tax treaties, and 3) international cooperation. The 





















unilaterally to reduce the benefits of tax competition. The overall effect of these reforms 
would be to reduce the tax advantages available to foreign-source income that has already 
benefited from preferential tax regimes. By doing this it is hoped that the incentives for 
taking advantage of tax competition will be reduced. The recommendations concerning 
tax treaties aim at strengthening the bilateral relationships that already exist between 
nations. The goal of these treaty recommendations is to ensure that tax treaties are not 
used to facilitate tax competition. One of the most important tax treaty recommendations 
is to increase the exchange of information between tax administrations, since bank 
secrecy laws are what allow income to be hidden in tax havens. The report also 
encourages both OECD members and nonmembers to cooperate to prevent the further 
spread of hamlful tax competition. It is recommended that nations work together to 
encourage each other to refrain from adopting new preferential tax measures, review their 
existing tax regimes in order to find any harmful competitive practices, and remove any 
preferential tax regimes that are found. None of these reforms will be successful without 
the cooperation of a large number of nations, but if this cooperation can be achieved 
harmful tax competition would be greatly reduced and so will the revenue problems faced 
by many governments (OECD, 1998). 
Some argue that the cooperation needed to reduce the problem of harmful tax 
competition can only be achieved through the creation of a world tax organization. The 
creation of international organizations has been popular since the end of World War Two. 
For example, the World Trade Organization deals with trade matters and the International 
Monetary Fund deals with issues surrounding macroeconomic stability and balance of 





















nations no longer compete with tariffs or exchange rates; today they use tax incentives. 
Thus they argue that it is time for the creation of an international organization that would 
deal with global tax issues. Such an organization could generate relevant tax statistics for 
the world, provide technical assistance to nations with tax administration problems, and 
provide a global forum for the resolution of tax disputes (Tanzi, 1998). Like the WTO's 
work to harmonize tariff rates, this tax organization could work towards the creation of a 
minimum tax level, which would reduce international spillover effects. 
3. CONCLUSION 
As in most policy debates, neither side has a monopoly on the truth, and thus 
which side one takes largely depends on one's beliefs regarding the proper role of 
government. Although international tax competition is relatively new, tax competition at 
the sub-national level has been in existence ever since local governments have been given 
the power to impose taxes. Therefore there is a large collection of literature on the 
subject of tax competition among local governments. A literature review by Timothy 
Goodspeed has looked at the literature on sub-national tax competition to see what it has 
to say about the international tax debate. According to Goodspeed, the literature implies 
that tax competition leads to an efficient allocation of resources only if benefit taxes are 
used, otherwise externalities are created which will lead to inefficient location decisions 
(Goodspeed, 1998). Thus the literature on sub-national tax competition implies that there 
are only two choices, either increase the world's use of benefit taxes or reduce the 
amount of international tax competition. Thus whether or not tax competition can be 
allowed to continue depends on how realistic it is to increase the global use of benefit 





















government. Those who view the government as an uncontrollable leviathan will support 
benefit taxes and tax competition at all levels of government, and those who have a 
benevolent view of government will tend to reject benefit taxes as being inequitable and 
seek the reduction of tax competition. Thus the debate surrounding international tax 
competition is only a part of a much larger and older debate about the nature of 
government and its role in society. 
IV: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF TAX RATES ON 
INVESTMENT LOCATION DECISIONS 
In today's economy there is a global market for capital, and this market faces 
numerous nationally based systems of taxing the income earned by capital. One potential 
problem with this high degree of differentiation among the world's tax regimes is that it 
might influence where investment is located. The problem with tax rates influencing 
investment location decisions is that this represents a distortion of real economic 
behavior, thus causing an inefficient allocation of the world's resources. Investment 
should be located where production can be conducted at the lowest possible cost, and this 
will happen if firms maximize their returns to investment. Yet, under real world 
conditions tax rates distort how a firm maximizes its returns. For example, if differences 
in tax rates change a firm's decision about where to locate, its production could occur in a 
nation with higher costs but lower taxes. The firnl nlay be maximizing its after-tax 
returns, but it is not maximizing its pre-tax returns. Thus its higher production costs 
create a global dead weight loss. 
This statistical study attempts to answer two related questions. First, this study 





















tax rate variation across countries. Second, this study attempts to determine if this 
sensitivity has changed over time. If the widely held notions of globalization are true and 
the world is indeed becoming an integrated market place where nations are becoming 
more alike, then one would think that tax rate differences between countries would be 
influential in U.S. firms' investment decisions. This is because tax rate differences would 
be one of the few remaining differences found between nations. But these widely held 
notions might not be accurate. If the forces of globalization increase international trade, 
then economic theory would imply that such trade would lead nations to specialize in the 
economic activities in which they have a comparative advantage. The implication of this 
line of argument is that rather than being a force of conformity, globalization could be a 
force of specialization. In a world where nations are specializing in certain types of 
economic activity, a nation's economic specialty would exert far more influence on U.S. 
investment decisions than would tax rate differences. 
In order to address these questions, this paper uses data published in the U.S. 
Commerce Department's Direct Investment Abroad Benchmark Surveys for the years 
1977, 1982, 1989, and 1994. These surveys contain financial data regarding the foreign 
affiliates of U.S. parent companies. From these data, measurements were acquired for 
U.S. investment abroad and for foreign effective tax rates that have all been aggregated to 
the country level. This study then combines these data with data from other sources in 
order to control for the non-tax features of the various countries, such as GNP per capita, 
population, and economic openness. After the data has been collected, there are between 





















This study then regresses a measure of U.S. multinational investment in each 
country on tax rate variables and measures of non-tax characteristics of the countries. 
Two measures of U.S. investment are used. The first is Plant, Product, and Equipment 
(PPE), which measures the book value of real productive assets held by American owned 
foreign affiliates. The second is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which measures the 
book value of the equity that American parent corporations hold in their foreign affiliates. 
Regressions are run using each type of investment in order to see what the effects of tax 
rate differentials might be on the two different types of investment. 
1. REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE 
This section will review four recent studies that are related to the one presented in 
this paper: Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), Altshuler, Grubert, and 
Newlon (1998), and Grubert and Mutti (2000). Just as in this paper, these four studies all 
use cross-sectional data, and they all attempt to measure the effect that tax rates have on 
the location of U.S. investment abroad. Two of these studies, Grubert and Mutti (1991) 
and Hines and Rice (1994), use data from the 1982 benchn1ark survey on U.S. direct 
investment published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, while the other two used 
data from the U.S. Treasury corporate tax files compiled by the Internal Revenue Service. 
Both Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) share one potential 
problem; their results may not be very useful if one is studying the effect of tax rates on 
the global location of U.S. productive capital investment. This is because both studies 
give tax havens a disproportionate amount of influence in their models. Grubert and 
Mutti (1991) do this in the way they structure their tax variable, and Hines and Rice 





















The potential problem with giving tax havens such disproportionate influence is that there 
are many cases in which the PPE owned by an affiliate in a tax haven is actually used in a 
branch in some other nation (Grubert and Mutti, 2000). In such cases the real capital 
attributed to a tax haven is not being used in that nation for any productive economic 
purpose. It is only being funneled through the tax haven, before it reaches its final 
location, in order to lower the parent corporation's global tax burden. Thus if a study is 
attempting to measure what influence tax rates have on the final location of productive 
investment, it should not give tax havens a disproportionate influence because tax havens 
are rarely the final location of such investment. 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) regress the log of net PPE on two different forms of the 
effective tax rate and on a number of non-tax characteristics in order to analyze the 
distribution of U.S. PPE among manufacturing affiliates in 33 countries. The first form 
of the tax variable that they use is the log of one minus the effective tax rate, calculated 
as total taxes paid divided by net pre-tax income. Using this form of the tax variable 
Grubert and Mutti are able to measure the sensitivity of investment demanded to changes 
in post-tax returns to investment, and they calculate an elasticity of 1.96. However this 
result was not statistically significant. The second form of the tax variable that they use 
is the inverse of the effecti ve tax rate. According to Grubert and Mutti this form of the 
tax variable indicates that, " ... tax incentives have a disproportionate effect at low rates." 
(Grubert and Mutti, 1991, p. 288). Thus the formation of the variable is based on the 
assumption that the elasticity becomes larger at lower tax rates. However the potential 
problem with this tax variable is that nations with such low tax rates tend to be tax 





















Grubert and Mutti's model. As previously mentioned, this could have reduced the 
accuracy of this study's measurements of PPE location. Using this form of the tax 
variable Grubert and Mutti calculate a positive and highly significant tax coefficient of 
0.11. Grubert and Mutti put this into perspective by stating, " ... based on the inverse 
formulation, a reduction in the host country tax rate from 20% to 10% is projected to 
increase U.S. affiliates' net plant and equipment in the country by 650/0." (Grubert and 
Mutti, 1991, p. 290). Yet, this tax coefficient of 0.11 calculated by Grubert and Mutti 
using their inverse formulation may have been made less accurate by its reliance on tax 
havens and the tax avoidance activities that occur in them. 
Hines and Rice (1994) also regress the log of net PPE on host country effective 
tax rates in order to consider the distribution of U.S. PPE among 73 countries. In their 
regression they calculate a tax coefficient equal to -3.3 that is statistically significant. 
However this large tax coefficient only translates into a -1 elasticity of PPE ownership 
with respect to tax rates (Hines, 1999). Hines and Rice are focusing on the activities of 
U.S. corporations within tax havens, thus half of their sample consists of tax haven 
countries. Also their sample is not restricted only to the activities of manufacturing 
firms, but also includes financial firms as welL By including so many tax havens, which 
generally are used only as an intermediate location of capital in order to lower tax 
burdens, and including the activities of financial firms, which specialize in such tax 
avoidance behavior, Hines and Rice may have encountered the same problem faced by 
Grubert and Mutti (1991). Thus their tax elasticity may also be an inaccurate measure of 





















The other two studies covered in this review, Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon 
(1998) and Grubert and Mutti (2000), use data from the U.S. Treasury corporate tax files 
compiled by Internal Revenue Service. Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (1998) use data 
from 1984 and 1992 in order to determine the sensitivity of investment location decisions 
to tax rate differences across 58 countries for each of these two years and to determine if 
this sensitivity has increased over time. They regress the log of PPE on the log of one 
minus the effective tax rate, calculated by dividing total taxes paid by pre-tax net income, 
and non-tax characteristics of the countries for both years. As in the Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) study, this form of the tax variable measures the sensitivity of real capital 
investment to after tax returns. The tax coefficient calculated by the 1984 regression is 
1.32, but is not statistically significant. The tax coefficient calculated by the 1992 
regression is 2.68 and is statistically significant at the five percent level. The results of 
this study imply that the sensitivity of investment to tax rate differences has increased 
over time, since the elasticity has risen from insignificance, in 1984, to 2.68, in 1992. 
The most recent study on the influence of tax rates on investment location 
decisions is Grubert and Mutti (2000). They use cross-sectional data on the 
manufacturing affiliates of U.S. manufacturing parents to analyze the distribution of real 
capital across 60 countries. Their data comes from the 1992 Treasury tax file, and just as 
in their previous study they use log (1-t) as their tax variable, where t is the effective tax 
rate calculated by dividing total taxes paid by pre-tax net income. A regression of the log 
of PPE on this tax variable and other variables, which represent non-tax country 





















indicates that a one percent change in after tax returns will lead to just over a three 
percent change in investment. 
To summarize, the previous work on this topic indicates that taxes do have a 
statistically significant effect on the location of U.S. real capital investment. Although 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) may have been influenced by the 
disproportionate influence of tax havens in their data, Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon 
(1998) and Grubert and Mutti (2000) do not appear to have given tax havens any 
disproportional influence. Both of these later studies calculated statistically significant 
tax elasticities of about three. However they also used the same data source for their 
regressions and nearly identical models, so it is not surprising that they achieved nearly 
the same results. 
This study is different from the previous literature it that it is the only study to 
include four years of data, while the most included by any previous study was two. Also, 
this is the only study to use not only PPE to measure investment, but FDI as well. 
Finally, this study is the only study, among those that use the U.S. Commerce 
Department's Benchmark Survey, to include geography dummy variables in its 
specification. All of these facts could be seen as improvements over the previous 
studies. 
2. DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
The principle data source for this study is the U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 
Benchmark Survey, which is conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce. These 
surveys have been published only for the years 1977, 1982, 1989, and 1994, and they 





















corporations. By using the Benchmark survey this study has limited itself to analyzing 
U.S. investment patterns instead of global investment patterns because the goal of this 
paper is to study the effect of differences in host country tax rates on investment choices 
across foreign locations, not on the choice between investing domestically and investing 
in a foreign market. This study also restricts its analysis to the investment activities of 
majority owned manufacturing affiliates of manufacturing U.S. parents. This is done to 
increase the accuracy of the study's measurements of PPE allocation because the PPE 
assets reported by a financial affiliate may be located in a country other than the one in 
which the affiliate is incorporated. By excluding the activities of financial firms from 
this study, the accuracy of PPE allocation measurements are maximized. From these 
surveys information regarding the investment patterns of U.S. parent companies and the 
tax burdens faced by their affiliates in various countries were collected and aggregated at 
the country level so that each observation consists of the information for an entire 
country, not just a single affiliate. 
The Benchmark data are then augmented with country specific non-tax data 
acquired from other sources in order to control for other country characteristics that 
might influence location decisions. Data regarding population, GNP per capita, and 
average inflation rates were obtained from the W orId Bank Development Reports. 
Population and GNP per capita both measure the size of an economy, while inflation 
measures an economy's price stability. Nations with high population and GNP per capita 
levels represent larger markets, which are more attractive to investors, while high 
inflation rates would tend to discourage investment since they are advantageous for 





















workforce, and thus would encourage investment. Since the gains from low tax rates 
might be less in nations with restrictive trade regimes, a measurement of each nation's 
economic openness was acquired from the Penn World Tables. This measurement is 
calculated by adding the value of a nation's imports and exports and dividing this total by 
the value of the nation's GDP. It thus represents the volume of international trade 
conducted by each nation as a percentage of its GDP. The final non-tax variables in this 
data set are five geographic dummy variables, with the five geographic categories being: 
Europe, South America, Africa and the Middle East, Asia, and AustralialNew Zealand. 
Since this is a study of U.S. investment patterns, this set of variables attempts to control 
for the cost of doing business with nations that do not border the United States. These 
dummy variables also capture any of these region's characteristics such as capital 
concentration and workforce productivity. 
2.1 Measuring Assets 
The benchmark surveys provide two means for measuring U.S. investment in its 
affiliate corporations. The first is net Plant, Product, and Equipn1ent (PPE), which 
measures the book value of real productive assets held by U.S. owned firms. The second 
is U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which measures the book value of the 
ownership claims in foreign affiliates held by controlling U.S. parent corporations. For 
example, assume there are two U.S. controlled foreign affiliates each with $100 million 
in assets entirely invested in PPE. One affiliate is 100 percent owned by its controlling 
U.S. parent, while the other is 60 percent owned by its controlling U.S. parent and 40 
percent owned by investors in the affiliate's host country. Both affiliates account for 





















in FDI, while the other firm only accounts for $60 million in FDI. Although PPE is the 
measurement used by the previous literature, both PPE and FDI have their strengths and 
weaknesses, and thus both have been used by this study. 
One potential problem with the PPE measure that is evident in the above example 
is that it can overstate the amount of a parent corporation's investment. As seen above, if 
an affiliate is responsible for $100 million in PPE investment, but it is only 60 percent 
owned by its parent corporation, then the parent corporation is still credited with $100 
million in PPE investment even though only 60 percent of the financing for that 
investment came from the parent corporation. However the rationale for gi ving the 
parent corporation credit for the $100 million in PPE investment is that since the parent 
corporation is the majority owner it is responsible for deciding the way in which the 
affiliate's assets are invested, even though it is not responsible for all of the financing. 
Another problem with the PPE measure is that the PPE assets reported by an 
affiliate may be located in a country other than the one in which the affiliate is 
incorporated. This problem usually occurs in tax havens, which often host large nUITlbers 
of financial affiliates and holding companies. Restricting this study exclusively to the 
activities of majority owned manufacturing affiliates of manufacturing u.s. parents is an 
attempt to minimize this problem. Also, there are few countries in this study that could 
be considered tax havens . 
FDI also has it weaknesses. One of these is that it is a measure of equity 
investment, not necessarily investment in productive capital such as factories and 
machinery. For example, if an affiliate were sold from one parent firm to a new parent 





















country in which the affiliate is located. Yet none of this money has been used to 
purchase improvements that might make the affiliate more productive, it is simply a 
transfer of equity from one parent to another. Thus neither PPE nor FDI is a perfect 
measure of investment. PPE is the superior measure for investments that go directly to 
increasing productivity, instead of equity financing or repatriation, while FDI is the 
superior measure for determining exactly how much investment financing came from 
each country. 
2.2 Measuring Effective Tax Rates 
Effective tax rates for the manufacturing affiliates of manufacturing U.S. parents 
in each country were calculated by dividing total taxes paid by total pretax net income. 
Both of these variables were acquired from the Commerce Department Benchmark 
Surveys. The primary problem with this tax variable is that it is endogenous to 
investment location decisions. If a nation has a sudden increase in investment that 
qualifies for certain incentive packages, like accelerated depreciation, then that nation's 
effective tax rate would be understated for that year. The only way to avoid this problem 
is to use an exogenous tax variable like the statutory corporate income tax rate. However 
although they are exogenous, statutory rates are less accurate than effective tax rates. 
This is due to the fact that the statutory tax rates do not capture the ad hoc investment 
incentives that governments may use to attract companies, while effective tax rates do. 
This is because effective rates are calculated using the total taxes paid by the affiliates in 
that country, while statutory rates only represent tax legislation. Thus they do not 





















studies mentioned in the literature review, uses the effective tax rate to construct the 
primary tax variables. 
Ideally a study would use the statutory rates as a robustness check, but 
unfortunately these statutory rates were not available for all the years of this study. Thus 
government revenue as a percentage of GDP was used instead. However it should be 
noted that this measure is not necessarily correlated with the tax rates faced by capital. It 
is possible that a nation could have revenues that are a higher percentage of GDP due to a 
high personal income tax rate or perhaps the nation receives large revenues from non-tax 
sources. This variable also acts as a measure of government spending for services that 
would attract investment. Yet despite these facts, this variable is a rough approximation 
of each nation's tax environment, since governments that tend to have higher levels of 
taxation would also have revenues that are a higher percentage of GDP. Due to this 
variable's ability to roughly describe each nation's tax environment and to the fact that it 
is likely to be exogenous to investment location decisions, it can be used to check the 
robustness of this study's results. Unfortunately, the data sets using government revenue 
as a percentage of GDP have fewer observations due to the fact that the information was 
not available for all the nations covered by the study. 
3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Once all these investment, tax, and country characteristic variables were 
collected, four data sets were constructed using effective tax rates as the tax variable and 
four smaller data sets were constructed using government revenue as a percentage of 
GDP as the tax variable. The effective tax rate data sets have between 37 and 48 





















between 32 and 42 observations. The descriptive statistics for these data sets are 
provided in tables one through eight. There are some notable outliers in each of the four 
years. In the 1977 data set there is a maximum effective tax rate value of92.81 %, and in 
the 1982 data set there is a maximum effective tax rate value of 98.88%, while the means 
were 41.07% and 46.08% respectively. Although these values are highly unlikely, they 
are true observations and removing them from the data sets had no effect on the quality of 
the regressions. There are also some notable inflation outliers. The inflation outliers for 
all four years are the inflation rates of South American countries, which seem to have a 
tendency toward hyperinflation. The most notable of these is Brazil with an inflation rate 
of 227.8% in 1989 and 900.3% in 1994. One more notable outlier is the maximum value 
of the openness variable, which for all four years has a value between 306.21 % and 
386.23%. All of these extreme openness values are the responsibility of Singapore, an 
extremely small nation that conducts an immense amount of international trade. There is 
also an interesting trend that is immediately noticeable in the descriptive statistics and 
this is the fact that the mean effective tax rate has decreased from 41.07% in 1977 to 
28.14% in 1994. This has occurred while the mean level of government revenue as a 
percentage of GDP has remained relatively stable during the same period. This trend is 
shown in table nine. Downward pressure on tax rates of this sort may have been caused 
by the various tax reform efforts that were carried out across the globe during the 1980s 
in response to the pressures of international tax competition. The fact that government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP has remained stable while the average effective tax rate 
has decreased implies that revenues lost due to lower tax rates have been recovered by 





















4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The model used in this study assumes that the supply of U.S. investment is a 
function of effective tax rates and country characteristics, such as population, GNP per 
capita, inflation, openness to international trade, and geographic location relative to the 
United States. This specification is very similar to the ones used in the previous studies, 
except that the earlier studies tended to use the log of one nlinus the effective tax rate as 
their tax variable, while this study simply uses the log of the effective tax rate2. The 
effective tax rate used by this study and the previous studies were all calculated in the 
same way, by dividing total foreign taxes paid by total pre-tax net income. As mentioned 
previously four regressions were run for each year with each regression using a different 
combination of investment and tax variables. Out of the four regressions done for each 
year the primary regression was one that used net PPE as the investment variable and 
effective tax rates as the tax variable. This is considered, by the previous literature, to be 
the most accurate model for measuring the sensitivity of real capital investment to tax 
rates. A second regression was then run using FDI as the investment variable instead of 
PPE. FDI measures more financial investment than does PPE and therefore can be used 
to determine whether or not financial investment is more sensitive to tax rates than is real 
capital investment. The third and fourth regressions run for each year use PPE and FDI 
respectively as the investment variable, but replace effective tax rates with government 
revenue as percentage of GDP. This is done as a sensitivity check in order to see how the 
use of an exogenous tax variable might affect the regression results. However, it should 
be noted that government revenue as a percentage of GDP also acts as a measurement of 
2 Log (t) was used instead oflog (l-t) because there is no fundamental difference between the two, except 





















government services which could potentially attract investment. Unfortunately, due to a 
lack of available information the data sets using government revenue as a percentage of 
GDP are smaller than the data sets using effecti ve tax rates. Thus their results cannot be 
directly compared. The results of all of these regressions are given in tables 10 through 
13. 
The results of the first regression, where PPE is used as the investment variable 
and effective tax rates are used as the tax variable, for the four years of this study imply 
that tax rates have no significant influence on the allocation of American real productive 
capital investment. However population, GNP per capita, and openness to international 
trade all had a positive statistically significant impact on investment location decisions, 
and a country's location in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia had a negative and 
statistically significant impact on investment location for all four years of the study. 
The fact that this study finds that effective tax rates have no statistically 
significant relationship with U.S. PPE location contrasts previous studies. Grubert and 
Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994), using the U.S. Commerce Department's 
benchmark survey, calculated statistically significant tax coefficients of 0.11 and -3.33 
respectively for 1982. However it should be noted that, while they did use the same data 
source as this study, the structures of their studies tended to give activities within tax 
havens a large degree of influence. Their measures for PPE may have been influenced by 
the fact that PPE owned by affiliates in tax havens tends to be used by branches in other 
nations. Thus their regressions may have measured financial investment to a larger 
degree than this study has. This might explain why they found significance while this 





















than is real productive investment. Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (1998) and Grubert 
and Mutti (2000), using the U.S. Treasury corporate tax files, found statistically 
significant tax coefficients of 2.7 and 3.23 respectively for 1992. The difference between 
their results and the results of this study may be explained by the fact that the information 
available in the U.S. Treasury corporate tax files allowed these two studies to use a larger 
number of observations. 
The results of the second regression, where FDI is used as the investment variable 
and effective tax rates are used as the tax variable, imply that tax rates do have a 
significant influence on U.S. FDI, but that this influence is on the decline. The FDI 
regression for the four years of this study produced the following tax elasticities: -1.021 
for 1977, -0.420 for 1982, -0.652 for 1989, and -0.436 for 1994. The tax elasticity for 
1982 is not statistically significant, but the tax elasticities for the other three years are 
statistically significant at the five percent level. One should note that FDI cannot be used 
as an accurate measure of real producti ve capital investment. This is due to the fact that 
FDI is only a measure of the value of the equity that U.S. parent corporations have in 
their foreign affiliates, not a measure of the value of the productive capital used by those 
affiliates. Yet these regressions are still interesting because they show that a nation's tax 
rates do have an impact on the amount of financial investment a nation will receive from 
U.S. firms, but this is not a very powerful impact since these elasticities are inelastic in 
every year of statistical significance except 1977. They are also interesting because a 
comparison of these elasticities implies that financial investment's sensitivity to tax rates 
has declined from an elasticity of -1.021 in 1977 to -0.436 in 1994. This decrease in the 





















member countries of the DEeD. The majority of FDI flows occur among DEeD 
members, and according to the International Monetary Fund the dispersion of these 
nation's effecti ve tax rates around the average effecti ve rate, as measured by the standard 
deviation, has declined from eight percent to five percent (Gropp and Kostial, 2001). 
This convergence of effective tax rates among DEeD members and the previously 
mentioned steady decline in the world's effective tax rates suggest that tax competition is 
an important issue and that governments may have redesigned their tax systems in order 
to prevent revenue loss from tax avoidance. 
The results of the third regression, where government revenue as a percentage of 
GDP is used as the tax variable and PPE is used as the investment variable, produced a 
statistically significant coefficient only for 1982. This coefficient was 1.588 and was 
significant at the five percent level. It should be noted that this coefficient is positive. 
Thus government revenue as a percentage of GDP is probably a better measure of a 
nation's government services than it is of the tax burden faced by an affiliate in that 
nation. This would explain the positive coefficient, since government services like 
investments in infrastructure, education, and security would attract investment. However 
since the other years failed to reach statistical significance, this set of regressions 
suggests that in general the amount of revenue raised by a government as a percentage of 
its GDP has no significant impact on U.S. PPE investment. 
The final set of regressions, where government revenue as a percentage of GDP is 
used as the tax variable and FDI is used as the investment variable, produced results that 
were similar to those just mentioned in the PPE regressions. However the one year that 




















0.654, which is significant at the 10 percent level. This result implies that U.S. FDI 
investment had an inelastic sensitivity to the level of revenues raised by a government in 
1989 as a percentage of its GDP. Also, the coefficient is positive just as it was in the PPE 
regression. This is more evidence of the attractive power that government services have 
over investment. Over all this set of regressions along with the previous PPE regressions 
suggest that generally government revenue as a percentage of GDP has no real impact on 
the level of U.S. PPE or FDI investment, thus effective tax rates are more relevant in 
capital location decisions. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Tax rate variation has the potential of distorting real economic activity and 
causing an inefficient allocation of the world's resources. Thus measuring the degree to 
which national tax regimes influence the allocation of U.S. real productive investment 
has been an active area of research in international taxation. The most recent studies all 
indicate that effective tax rates do playa significant role in influencing location decisions. 
However, this study is different from the previous literature it that it is the only study to 
include four years of data, while the most included by any previous study was two. Also, 
this is the only study to use not only PPE to measure investment, but FDI as well. 
Finally, this study is the only study, among those that use the U.S. Commerce 
Department's Benchmark Survey, to include geography dummy variables in its 
specification. All of these facts could be seen as improvements over the previous 
studies. 
The results of this study offer evidence that contrasts the findings of the previous 




















statistically significant influence on U.S. real productive investment as measured by PPE. 
These results also suggest that a nation's tax environment does have a statistically 
significant influence on U.S. financial investment as measured by PDI, but this influence 
has been declining from an elasticity of -1.021 in 1977 to -0.436 in 1994 due to a possible 
convergence of international tax rates. When these same regressions were run using 
government revenue as a percentage of GDP instead of effective tax rates, the PPE 
regressions had a significant coefficient of 1.588 in 1982 and the PDI regressions had a 
significant coefficient of 0.654 in 1989, but no other years had significant coefficients. 
Thus this measure of a nation's tax environment seems to have no real impact on PPE or 
PDI investment for most years of the study. The general conclusion of this study is that a 
nation's tax regime has little or no influence on the location of U.S. productive 
investment, but it does have a significant although declining influence over the location 
of U.S. financial investment. The importance of these finding is that they suggest tax rate 
variation may cause little distortion in the location of productive assets, and a declining 
distortion in the location of financial assets. Thus the major problem with the world's tax 
system may not be the distortion of investment location, but the revenue loss that results 
from multinational firms using tax regime differences to avoid taxes. 
SECTION V: CONCLUSION 
Globalization has radically increased the potential influence that tax policy has on 
international economic activity. Before today's forces of globalization were realized, the 
nations of the world could impose taxes using both the source and residence principles of 
taxation without there being any large effects on international economic behavior. Yet in 





















problem of distorting investment location decisions, and the lack of harmonization can 
lead to losses of tax revenue. The goal of this study was to provide an introduction to this 
new issue in international public finance and a summary of the debate surrounding it. 
In section two it was shown that through tax avoidance multinational firms have 
the capacity to greatly reduce their tax burdens. The primary forms of this tax avoidance 
involve the financing of foreign affiliates, the setting of prices used in intra-firm 
commerce, and the location of research and development. According to empirical studies 
cited in this section, all of these forms of tax avoidance are commonly used by 
multinational firms. 
Such tax avoidance creates an element of competition between the world's tax 
regimes. According to one's views regarding the role of government, one could either 
see this competition as a positive force for creating government efficiency or as a 
destructi ve force threatening to eliminate the welfare state and all hope for greater global 
equity. The primary difficulty with all of the various reforms proposed by both sides of 
this debate is that trying to reform taxes on a global scale would be a massive challenge 
because there will always be incentives for a small group of nations to cheat on any 
international agreement. The only thing that both sides of the debate agree on is that the 
world's tax system is in need of some kind of reform. 
The fourth section of this study conducted an empirical analysis in order to 
determine the influence that tax rates have on U.S. investment location decisions. Its 
results were that tax rates have little or no influence on the location of PPE investment 
and an inelastic and declining influence on FDI investment. These results are a contrast 





















influence on investment location decisions. Further research will be needed before the 




- Table 1: 1977 Effective Tax Rate Data Set 
Variable Number of Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum - Observations FDI 37 3105.27 5982.37 39 33128 
PPE 37 2326.19 4847.95 74 25990 
~te 37 41.07% 17.58 6.91% 92.81 % 
NP/Capita 37 4132.73 3038.96 420 9970 -
Population 37 25.201 29.001 0.358 116.1 
InDation 37 22.04% 44.70 4.5% 267.8% - Openness 37 70.30% 56.95 15.17% 332.5% 
- Table 2: 1977 Gov. Rev. % of GDP Data Set 
Variable Number of Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Observations - FDI 32 3491.88 6355.16 58 33128 
PPE 32 2621.19 5158.29 74 25990 
Gov. Rev. % of 32 33.43% 11.51 13.45% 55.18% - GDP GNP/Capita 32 4435.34 3018.67 420 9970 
Population 32 26.961 30.182 0.358 116.1 
InDation 32 23E 48.02 4.5 67.8% 
Openness 32 67. 58.04 15.17% 332.5% -
- Table 3: 1982 Effective Tax Rate Data Set 
Variable i Number of Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum - i Observations FDI 41 4219.61 7685.66 34 41890 
PPE 41 3464.17 6808.08 55 32924 
Tax Rate 41 46.08% 22.46 3.65% 98.88% - GNP/Capita 41 6032.68 5089.6 260 17010 Population 41 47.183 113.19 0.220 717 
InDation 41 16.45% 20.8'1 I 4.8% 136% - Openness 41 75.22% 63.36 14.89% 386.23% 
Table 4: 1982 Gov. Rev. % of GDP Data Set -
Variable Number of Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Observations - FDI 37 4579.43 8012.74 34 41890 PPE 37 3746.7 7115.69 55 32924 
Gov. Rev. % of 37 32.7% 12.97 11.89% 61.21 % 
GDP - GNP/Capita 37 6048.92 4965.03 260 17010 
Population 37 49.365 118.463 0.220 717 




- Table 5: 1989 Effective Tax Rate Data Set 
Variable Number of Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum - Observations FDI 46 664 13061.163 84 61926 
PPE 46 5052.26 11350.52 34 63636 - Tax Rate 46 36.84% 22.98 1.85% 94.71 % GNP/Capita 46 9429.13 8445.38 250 29880 
Population 46 49.964 124.82 0.260 832.500 
Inflation 46 18.11 % 37.30 1.1 % 227.8% - Openness 46 78.75% 62.79 13.24% 368.65% 
- Table 6: 1989 Gov. Rev. % of GDP Data Set 
Variable Number of Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Observations - FDI 42 71.54.67 13559.29 84 61926 
PPE 42 5429.62 11814.44 34 63636 
Gov. Rev. % of 42 28.20% 10.96 1.34% 47.99% 
GDP 
GNP/Capita 42 10023.33 85nH 340 I 29880 
Population 42 51.701 129.7 0.260 832.500 
-
Inflation 42 18.776% 38.974 1.1 % 227.8% - Openness 42 74.53% 58.82 13.24% 368.65% 
- Table 7: 1994 Effective Tax Rate Data Set 
Variable Number of Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum - Observations FDI 48 9950.77 17188.63 186 90251 
PPE 48 6808.83 12603.17 182 61008 
Tax Rate 48 I 28.14% 15.59 1.43% 64.29% - GNP/Capita 48 11778.75 10597.76 I 280 37930 Population 48 76.944 211.634 
I 
0.404 1190.900 
Inflation 48 46.16% 150.36 1.3% 900.3% - Openness 48 62.35% 56.01 13.47% 306.21 % 
Table 8: 1994 Gov. Rev. % of GDP Data Set -
Variable Number of Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Observations - FDI 34 12100.97 19853.07 198 90251 PPE 34 8440.35 14591.77 182 61008 
Gov Rev % of 34 31.46% 10.65 7.65% 48.1 % 
GDP - GNP/Capita 34 14528.53 10515.18 1200 37930 
Population 34 27.465 29.20 0.404 125 






















Table 9: Tax Trends 
Tax Variable 1977 1982 1989 1994 
Effective Tax 41.07% 46.08% 36.84% 28.14% 
Rate 
Gov. Rev. % 33.43% 32.70% 28.20% 31.46% 
ofGDP 
Table 10: Regressions using Log of PPE and Log of Effective Tax Rate 
Variables 1977 1982 1989 1994 
Constant -5.786** -3.433 -9.669** -10.526** 
(-2.05) (-0.89) (-2.76) (-3.79) 
Log Effective -0.028 -0.014 -0.184 0.309 
Tax Rate (-0.10) (-0.04) (-0.97) (1.63) 
Log Population 1.212** 1.039** 1.373** 1.181** 
(6.06) (3.88) (7.25) (7.08) 
Log GNP/Capita 0.748** 0.582** 1.005** 0.947** 
(3.85) (2.83) (5.85) (6.64) 
Log Inflation -0.265 -0.236 -1.156 -0.103 
(-1.13) (-0.63) (-0.96) (-0.77) 
Log Openness 1.405** 1.46** 1.727** 1.672** 
(3.06) (2.35) (3.90) (4.91) 
Europe -1.672** -2.639** -2.025** -1.04* 
(-2.73) (-2.30) (-2.86) (-1.65) 
South America -0.616 -0.86 -0.372 0.659 
(-0.90) (-0.67) ( -0.44) (0.84) 
Africa and -1.383* -3.169** -1.829** -1.308* 
Middle East (-1.80) (-2.44) (-2.24) (-1.81) 
Asia -2.972** -3.476** -2.747** -1.889** 
(-4.04) (-2.69) (-3.41) (-2.90) 
Australia and -0.564 -1.525 -0.065 0.543 
Pacific (-0.69) (-1.09) (-0.07) (0.63) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.7214 0.4689 0.6825 0.6991 
Number of Observations 37 41 46 48 
Notes: 1) t values are given in parentheses, 2) **indicates significance at the 5% 





















Table 11: Regressions using Log of FDI and Log of Effective Tax Rate 
Variables 1977 1982 1989 1994 
Constant 1.268 -0.012 -4.864 -6.294** 
(0.43) (-0.00) (-1.31) (-2.10) 
Log Effective -1.021** -0.420 -0.652** -0.436** 
Tax Rate (-3.41) (-1.39) (-3.25) (-2.12) 
Log Population I 1.215** 0.95** 1.175** 1.114** 
I (5.83) (3.93) (5.87) (6.18) 
Log GNP/Capita I 0.708** 0.665** 1.087** 1.044** 
(3.50) (3.59) (5.99) (6.77) 
Log Inflation -0.75** -0.574* -0.256 -0.208 
(-3.07) (-1.70) (-1.48) (-1.44) 
Log Openness 0.995** 1.12** 1.022** 1.228** 
(2.08) (2.00) (2.18) (3.34) 
Europe 1.64** -2.43** -2.032** -1.298* 
I ~ 2.57) (-2.35) (-2.72) (-1.91) 
erica .. 0.18 -0.539 -0.474 0.397 
(-0.25) (-0.47) (-0.54) (0.47) 
Africa and -1.486* -3.577** .. 1.706** -1.504* 
Middle East (-1.86) ( .. 3.05) (-1.97) (-1.93) 
Asia -3.053** -3.391** -2.573** -2.042** 
(-3.98) (-2.91) (-3.02) (-2.90) 
Australia and -0.3 -1.412 .. 0.49 -0.031 
Pacific I (-0.35) ( .. 1.12) (-0.48) (-0.03) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.7287 0.5814 0.6690 0.6760 
Number of Observations 37 41 46 48 
Notes: 1) t values are given in parentheses, 2) **indicates significance at the 5% 






















Table 12: Regressions using Log of PPE and Log of Gov. Rev. % of GDP 
Variables 1977 1982 1989 1994 
Constant -8.2** -8.293** -10.705** -12.042** 
I 
(-2.72) (-2.06) (-2.67) (-2.55) 
Log Gov. Rev. o/c of 0.471 1.588** 0.209 0.083 
GDP (0.51) (2.11) (0.61) (0.10) 
Log Population 1.238** 0.897** 1.334** 1.338** 
(6.33) (3.59) (6.32) (7.32) 
Log GNP/Capita 0.839** 0.676** 1.002** 1.139** 
(2.24) (3.13) (4.67) (2.94) 
Log Inflation -0.195 -0.026 -0.187 -0.177 
(-0.75) (-0.07) (-0.89) (-0.85) 
Log Openness 1.346** 0.951 1.734** 1.706** 
(2.77) (1.40) (3.28) (3.31) 
Europe -1.85** -2.555** -2.181 ** -1.189* 
(-2.91) (-2.36) (-2.77) (-1.95) 
South America -0.696 -0.142 -0.321 0.876 
(-0.99) (-0.12) (-0.35) (1.13) 
Africa and -1.807** -1.614 -1.94** -1.417* 
Middle East -2.09 (-1.13) (-2.18) (-1.78) 
Asia -2.977** -1.93 -2.788** -1.844** 
(-3.87) (-1.36) (-3.10) (-2.79) 
Australia and -0.716 -1.592 -0.283 0.644 
Pacific (-0.88) (-1.21) (-0.26) (0.79) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.7438 0.5641 0.6482 0.7814 
Number of Observations 32 37 42 34 
Notes: 1) t values are given in parentheses, 2) **indicates significance at the 5% 





















Table 13: Regressions using Log of FDI and Log of Gov. Rev. % of GDP 
Variables 1977 1982 1989 1994 
Constant -4.909 -4.208 -7.396 -15.388** 
(-1.49) (-1.08) (-1.62) (-3.08) 
Log Gov. Rev. % of -0.272 1.02 0.654* -0.673 
GDP (-0.27) (1.41) (1.68) (-0.80) 
Log Population 1.02** 0.768** 1.074** 1.25** 
(4.76) (3.18) (4.46) (6.47) 
Log GNP/Capita 1.091** 0.688** 0.952** 1.69** 
(2.65) (3.30) (3.89) (4.13) 
Log Inflation -0.627** -0.489 -0.426* -0.156 
(-2.21) (-1.37) (-1.77) (-0.70) 
Log Openness 1.158** 0.846 1.109* 2.069** 
(2.18) (1.29) (1.84) (3.79) 
I Europe -1.932** -2.381** -2.483** .. 1.255* 
(-2.78) (-2.28) (-2.77) (-1.95) 
South America 0.13 0.234 -0.345 1.088 
(0.17) (0.20) (-0.33) (1.33) 
Africa and -1.649* -2.421* -1.866* -1.208 
Middle East (-1.74) (-1.75) (-1.84) (-1.43) 
Asia -3.281** -2.395* -3.019** -2.161** 
(-3.89) (-1.75) (-2.94) (-3.09) 
Australia and -1.067 -1.544 -1.098 0.167 
Pacific (-1.20) (-1.22) (-0.90) (0.19) 
rAdjusted R Squared 0.6976 0.5872 0.5582 0.7722 
Number of Observations 32 37 42 34 
Notes: 1) t values are given in parentheses, 2) **indicates significance at the 5% 
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